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Abstract: Problem statement: Security Management has become a critical aspect for large scale 
distributed systems. Particularly, recent Distributed Intrusion Detection Systems (DIDS) schemes in 
High  Speed  Networks  (HSN)  have  raised  new  serious  management  problems  and  challenges. 
Increasing the effectiveness of IDS monitoring is primordial to satisfy the restrictive constraints in 
such  large  multi-domains  environment  for  narrow  context  of  HSN.  Approach:  We  consider  the 
intrusion detection monitoring as a two facets entity: one at local level (single domain) and another at 
the global one (multi-domains). Through the local level, evolution of single domain intrusion detection 
process (vulnerability data collection, alert generation and sensor configuration according to some 
improvement  scenarios)  can  be  monitored.  The  global  level  represents  evolution  of  multi-domain 
intrusion detection process as well as the eventual security defending process through overall network 
(policy generation, load balancing operations and global alert correlation). Differentiating these two 
facets,  leads  to  the  design  of  a  scalable  intrusion  detection  management  solution.  Results:  The 
effectiveness  of  DIDS  management  in  HSN  had  been  studied  and  an  IDS  scalable  monitoring 
architecture  for  multi-domains  had  been  proposed.  Several  scenarios  of  Snort  IDS  showed  an 
improvement on the performance of real-time detection. An integration of a set of tools provided a 
convivial  IDS  monitoring  platform.  Conclusion:  To  satisfy  the  constraints  of  Intrusion  detection 
process in term of real-time and efficiency in HSN we need to monitor efficiently the IDS process. In 
this context, the management framework outlined is more appropriate, convenient and efficient. The 
herein  proposed  architecture,  the  snort  IDS  improvement  techniques  and  the  integrated  platform 
played a crucial role in improving of IDS real-time monitoring.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
  The goal of security management is to control the 
access to sensitive information and resources based on 
security  policies  to  prevent  and  defend  against 
intentional  or  unintentional  attacks  in  the  network. 
Among the well-known network defending techniques 
stay the Intrusion Detection  Systems (IDS). The IDS 
scans the incoming or outgoing network traffic in order 
to  detect  the  malicious  or  suspicious  activities.  As 
networks  become  faster  such  that  the  High  Speed 
Networks (HSN), there is a need for IDS to perform 
security analysis techniques that can keep up with the 
increased network throughput otherwise  it becomes a 
network  bottleneck.  Efficient  management  of 
Distributed IDS (DIDS) is both a crucial requirement 
and a  major challenge  for security services. Building 
management  solutions  which  can  address  scalability, 
efficiency and real-time constraints for IDS is a key to 
their successful deployment. But, due to the differences 
between  high  speed  networks  and  usual  networks,  the 
potentially huge number of packets evolved over time, the 
design  and  implementation  of  the  afore  mentioned 
management services are much more complex to achieve.   
 
Related  work:  Several  efforts  are  driven  in  the 
literature in the context of intrusion detection process. 
(Wang and Liu, 2008) establishes a whole work model 
on  the  basis  of  intrusion  detection  techniques  and 
proposes  to  establish  a  data  warehouse  of  intrusion 
detection  to  provide  an  efficient  and  stable  system. 
(Roschke  et  al.,  2009)  presents  an  extensible  IDS 
management architecture to manage security event and 
correlation.  It  is  based  on  the  virtualization  concept 
which integrates and handles different types of sensors 
or  collects  and  synthesizes  alerts  generated  from 
multiple  hosts  located  in  a  loosely  coupled 
environment.  Yu  et  al.  (2004),  an  intrusion  alert 
management  system  based  on  a  collaborative 
architecture  design  for  multiple  intrusion  detection J. Computer Sci., 7 (7): 1094-1104, 2011 
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systems to work together is developed.  By aggregating 
alerts and correlating events based on logical relations 
they reduce the alert processing overload and generate a 
global  and  synthesized  alert  report.  A  model, 
architecture and an implementation of an information 
manager for IDS using the technology of cooperative 
Multi-agents Systems and Web Services are presented 
in  (Claudino  et  al.,  2006).  The  main  goal  of  their 
information manager module is to keep safe and update 
of information that is necessary for the development of 
inherent  functions  of  an  IDS.  The  validation  and 
correctness of security policies is discussed in (Blanc et 
al., 2006). The authors propose a global architecture, 
based on an original meta-policy approach for access 
control  and  intrusion  detection,  to  guarantee  global 
security  properties.  Their  main  idea  is  to  apply 
verification  techniques  on  the  meta-policy  while 
supporting local updates of the security policy so that 
the  system  can  verify  the  respect  of  global  security 
properties  after  meta  or  local  modifications  of  the 
policy.    Stakhanova  et  al.  (2009)  the  problem  of  the 
IDS  rule  conflict  is  involved.  Since  any  conflict  that 
arises  between  rules  in  the  signature-based  IDS 
detection could put the system in a vulnerable position, 
the authors address this conflict in host and network-
based  intrusion  detection  and  response  devices.  
Besides,  they  present  a  rule  management  framework 
that  allows  rule  set  analysis  for  potential  conflicts. 
Finally  in  (Betser  et  al.,  2001)  the  ubiquitous 
interoperability  of  intrusion  detection  components 
across Internet is presented. 
  On  other  hand  different  standard  management 
frameworks have been proposed and developed in the 
literature.  SNMP  and  CMIP  are  generic  standard 
management frameworks both work in a very similar 
manner. They allow administrators/managers to query 
agents  monitoring  devices  such  that  bridges,  hubs, 
routers,  network  servers  (Kim  et  al.,  2005).  Policy-
based  Network  Management  (PBNM)  is  another 
emerging  and  promising  technology  enabling  a 
manager to specify  what he wants to do and the end 
result, without having to know how to accomplish it for 
the specific devices. It performs network management 
based on policies. A policy is a rule governing choices 
in behavior of the system. The goal is to change system 
behavior  without  modifying  implementation.  PBNM 
facilitates  the  dynamic  change  of  behavior  of  a 
distributed management system and permits the reuse 
of the managers in different environments (Kim et al., 
2005;  Ok  et  al.,  2006).  DMTF  defined  the  DEN 
approach  developed  as  an  extension  to  Common 
Information Model (CIM) by adding network devices 
and services to it. In this approach we use LDAP as 
new  way  to  store  management  information.  Mainly 
LDAP  is  used  as  a  database  for  the  configuration 
information.  It  provides  secure  access  and  simple 
querying  features  based  on  simple  filters.  Common 
Open  Policy  Service  (COPS)  defined  by  IETF  is 
another  possible  implementation  protocol  of  DEN 
approach. It is a common protocol between elements 
and policy server. It sends status updates and requests 
to  remote  policy  decision  server  to  get  back  policy 
decisions as well as it provides mechanisms to push or 
pull  policies  (Howes  et  al.,  2001;  Goncalves  et  al., 
2009).  The  IETF  through  the  IDWG  (Intrusion 
Detection  Working  Group)  defined  a  general  IDS 
architecture through four boxes; Event-boxes which are 
the  sensors,  Database-boxes  which  store  information 
from  Event  boxes  for  subsequent  processing  by 
Analysis-boxes to detect potential hostile behavior and 
Response-boxes  to  execute  an  intrusion  reaction. 
Furthermore  the  IDWG  specified  Intrusion  Alert 
Protocol (IAP) to facilitate an interoperability which is 
critical for intrusion detection for large networks. 
  In  terms  of  management  technologies,  the  active 
networks,  JMX  and  P2P  are  the  main  ones.  Active 
network  technology  is  well-known  for  flexibility  and 
extensibility.  It  enables  to  dynamically  configure  and 
operate network nodes. For example we can adapt rapid 
and online load balancing  strategies, activate security 
components or  more generally push event correlation 
and load balancing algorithms where they are needed 
(Ladner  et  al.,  2007).  Java  Management  eXtension 
(JMX) Framework can also be used to manage an IDS 
system. All objects will be defined as MBeans and the 
service communicates with the management application 
using Java Remote Method Invocation (RMI). Simple 
Object  Access  Protocol  (SOAP)  is  another  way  to 
invoke  methods  on  classes  and  objects  that  exist  on 
remote  servers;  it  is  emerging  alternative  to  other 
component based languages such as DCOM, CORBA. 
SOAP is used on top of HTTP and uses XML for the 
syntax.  By  using  these  two  ubiquitous  technologies, 
SOAP  inherits  many  advantages  among  which  are 
interoperability,  ubiquity  and  pervasiveness.  The 
intermediary  format  generates  an  overhead  in  the 
messaging  that  cuts  down  performance  and  therefore 
limits its usability for very systems requiring frequent 
changes and updates. Finally, since the DIDS process 
needs  to  share  different  types  of  files  such  that 
vulnerability report files, security policy rules, intrusion 
detection  rules  and  attack  alerts  files  and  security 
reports about the network security status, Peer-to-Peer 
(P2P) technology which employs distributed resources 
to perform a critical function in a decentralized manner 
makes easy the exchange of these files and the sharing J. Computer Sci., 7 (7): 1094-1104, 2011 
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of the security information with other entities (Sallay, 
2009).  This  will  increase  the  effectiveness  of  the 
security monitoring and allows for greater automation 
to take action in real-time against intruders. 
  We observe that even if some interesting generic 
standard  management  frameworks  and  technologies 
exist;  they  need  an  instantiation  for  high  speed 
networks  through  a  specification  of  a  dedicated 
management  framework.    The  intended  framework 
should couple both technical and management plans. In 
the technical plan we should: (1) design an underlying 
scalable  and  adaptive  parallel  and  distributed  IDS 
architecture,  (2)  develop  algorithms  and  techniques 
improving  the  accuracy  of  alert  generation  and 
correlation.  In the Management plan we should design 
and  develop  an  efficient  integrated  management 
platform coupling these aforementioned algorithms and 
techniques to the underlying architecture. The goal of 
the  work  undertaken  in  our  group  is  to  build  such  a 
framework to manage DIDS entities.  Ben et al. (2010a; 
2010b), we exposed the different architectures used in 
High  Performance  Computing  (HPC),  the  common 
high-speed  networks,  the  programming  models,  the 
communications  models,  and  the  communication 
libraries. Rouached et al. (2010), we stated the need of 
HPC  for  DIDS  and  we  discussed  the  design 
requirements of the system. We studied the mapping of 
the  different  requirements  over  the  software  and 
hardware  features  of  HSN.  We  proposed  several 
recommendations  for  the  design  of  IDS  over  HSN, 
starting  from  the  communication  protocol  and  the 
programming model that should be adopted, to the way 
the system should handle the communication flow, the 
memory  management  and  the  data  transfer  between 
IDS sensors. We presented a formal based approach to 
intrusion  detection  in  the  context  of  high  speed 
networks. We proposed the global architecture of our 
approach and detailed its components. We also showed 
how the proposed formalism can be used. Sallay et al. 
(2010), a security model as well as an architecture able 
to  perform  automated  and  procedural  security 
safeguards  are  proposed.  Sallay  et  al.  (2009),  we 
presented an optimized scalable distributed architecture 
which  is  about  10  times  quicker  than  the  centralized 
architecture.  The  solution  is  based  on  switch-based 
splitting approach that supports intrusion detection on 
high-speed  links  by  balancing  the  traffic  load  among 
different sensors running Snort placed in each point of 
access to the Internet. Sallay (2009), we designed and 
implemented  a  P2P  platform  dedicated  to  share 
different types of files such as vulnerability report files, 
security  policy  rules,  intrusion  detection  rules,  attack 
alerts  files  and  security  reports  about  the  network 
security status, in a decentralized manner making easy 
the  exchange  of  these  files  and  the  sharing  of  the 
security information involved by the DIDS process. 
 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
 
  In this study we deal with some management plan 
issues. The main objective is to increase the efficiency, 
scalability  and  the  effectiveness  of  DIDS  security 
monitoring in the context of the HSN. This will allow 
for  greater  automation  to  take  action  in  real-time 
against intruders. Mainly, this work investigates three 
specific  points  (1)  DIDS  management  architecture 
dedicated to the multi-domain environment (its design 
challenges,  description  and  implementation).  (2) 
Efficiency improvement of Snort IDS according to four 
scenarios  in  order  to  enhance  the  real  time  of  IDS 
process  capability.  (3)  An  integrated  monitoring 
platform  dedicated  to  manage  IDS  process  in  the 
context of single domain environment.  
 
The DIDS management framework: 
Design  challenges:  Efficient  management  of  DIDS 
systems  is  both  a  crucial  requirement  and  a  major 
challenge  for  security  services.  Building  management 
solutions which can address scalability, efficiency and 
real-time constraints for IDS is a key to their successful 
deployment. But, due to the differences of  high speed 
networks  with  usual  networks,  namely,  the  potentially 
huge number of packets evolved over time, the design 
and implementation of the afore mentioned management 
services are much more complex to achieve. 
  To  be  efficient  in  the  IDS  management  context, 
four factors need to be considered (1) the traffic and 
attacks behavior (2) the scale factor (3) the degree of 
specialization for the alert event correlation functions 
and, (4) the ease of deployment and integration with the 
legacy. In such an evolving environment, the signaling 
and management plan loops sometime share very close 
timing  requirements,  management  being  forced  to 
follow near real-time constraints found in the control 
plane.  The  problem  of  scalability  is  due  to  the 
architectural  design,  its  implementation  and  the 
associated management solutions. 
  For  management  solutions  dedicated  to  DIDS 
systems, scalability is essentially a gradient of: (1) the 
size  of  the  traffic  and  its  nature  (2)  the  number  of 
domains to manage, (3) the number of IDS nodes of 
each managed domains, (4) the number of alert events 
for each sensor (5) the frequency of change in sensors 
groups (6) the overhead of management and signaling. 
The Design of efficient management solutions that can 
scale up to hundreds of domains and thousands of IDS J. Computer Sci., 7 (7): 1094-1104, 2011 
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nodes  with  millions  of  security  alert  events,  while 
maintaining a limited management overhead, remains a 
very challenging task. 
  Event  correlation  functions  and  load  balancing 
algorithms have to integrate the specific nature of IDS 
process  in  the  definition  of  the  corresponding 
management  applications  and  related  metrics.  For 
example, it is not an easy task to maintain in real-time 
an up-to-date central knowledge of the alerts together 
with their distribution in a multi-domain environment. 
Thus, if one of the event correlation approaches relies 
on  considering  the  exact  number  of  alerts,  these 
operations  must  be  traced  in  a  very  precise  way. 
Moreover new parameters like the number of sensors, 
the overall number of domains and sensors in a given 
network, traffic volume and memory usage within hosts 
must be considered in the load balancing process for 
DIDS systems. 
  To  be  well  integrated,  any  management  solution 
must  provide  gateways  and  interfaces  to  existent 
protocols  and  frameworks  and  take  advantage  of  the 
most recent technologies to facilitate their deployment 
and configuration. Moreover the management platform 
must be sufficiently open and dynamic to adapt itself to 
changes and to be capable of supporting new types of 
management algorithms. 
 
Management architecture: The main concept behind 
our architecture is to distribute as much as possible both 
management  data  and  processing  units  to  maintain  a 
high degree of adaptability and ensure scalability. This 
distribution follows a pattern that enables composition 
and coupling of operations. 
  We consider the intrusion detection monitoring as a 
two facets entity: one at the local level and another at 
the global one. Through the local level, the evolution of 
the  single  domain  intrusion  detection  process 
(vulnerability data collection, sensor configuration and 
alert  generation)  can  be  monitored.  The  global  level 
represents the evolution of the multi-domain intrusion 
detection  process  as  well  as  the  eventual  security 
defending process through the overall network (policy 
generation, load balancing operations and global alert 
correlation). Differentiating these two  facets, leads to 
the design of a scalable intrusion detection management 
solution. 
  The  overhead  generated  by  the  transport  of 
management  data  related  to  an  intrusion  detection 
service can also be reduced by setting the granularity of 
the  data  to  be  exchanged.  Thus,  only  data  that  is 
mandatory for a given management task is sent over the 
network. Management data storage becomes necessary 
at the places where these data are produced and tasks 
can  be  delegated  to  the  various  network  nodes  that 
participate  in  the  intrusion  detection  service 
management  chain.  In  this  case,  the  processing 
distribution follows the data distribution providing an 
efficient solution for large security data and processing 
amount  involved  by  the  high  speed  network 
environments. The proposed architecture provides a 3-
level hierarchy: the top management level, intermediate 
management level and the end management level. At 
each  level  of  the  hierarchy  a  dedicated  management 
agent is operational.  
  At  the  top  management  level,  a  Multi  Domain 
Manager  (MDM)  is  in  charge  of  the  multi-domain 
intrusion  detection  management  activities.  The  MDM 
hosts  a  data  storage  facility  that  has  the  entire  data 
related  to  the  overall  intrusion  service.  At  the 
intermediate level, a Single Domain Manager (SDM) in 
each  network  domain  manages  the  local  intrusion 
detection  facet  of  the  intrusion  detection  process.  It 
maintains a local view of attack attempts performed by 
enemy users and holds the local database populated by 
the IDS sensors according to specific exchange policy. 
The SDM maintains an interaction with the underlying 
sensors as  well as an interaction upward towards the 
MDM. At the end management level, IDS sensors are 
deployed. To this end, the sensors analyze the traffic 
and  build  a  database  which  holds  very  detailed  data 
about each security alerts. 
 
Efficiency  improvement  of  Snort  IDS:  To  improve 
snort performance, we defined four main scenarios: 
 
·  Service  Oriented  Scenario:  Optimization  for  a 
specific network service (i.e., HTTP) 
·  Platform-Oriented  Scenario:  Optimization  using 
vulnerability assessment tools' results 
·  Real-Time-Oriented  Scenario:  Optimization  for  a 
specific HW/SW configuration 
·  Flow-Oriented  Scenario:  Optimization  using 
filtered input network data-flow 
 
Service-oriented  scenario:  We  modify  the  Snort 
source code and configuration files by removing unused 
preprocessor for a specific sensor (i.e., HTTP) to treat 
only  target  packets.  Main  preprocessors  included  in 
snort-2.9.0 are: FRAG3, STREAM5, HTTP_INSPECT, 
RPC_DECODE,  BO  (Back  Orifice  detection), 
FTP_TELNET, SMTP, SSH, DCERPC2 (SMB / DCE-
RPC normalization and anomaly detection), DNS, SSL. 
In  this  scenario,  we  remove  the  following 
preprocessors: FTP_TELNET, SMTP, SSH, DNS.  J. Computer Sci., 7 (7): 1094-1104, 2011 
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Fig. 1: Snort rules filtering process 
 
Platform-oriented  scenario:  The  main  problem  in 
NIDS based-rule is the generation of a large number of 
false alerts. Optimizing NIDS based-rule by decreasing 
the number of rules can reduce the amount of alerts, 
traffic scanning time and increase alerts accuracy. The 
basic  idea  of  this  approach  is  to  efficiently  correlate 
between  NIDS  rules  and  vulnerability  assessment 
application  report.  This  report  contains  information 
about  the  network  security  state  such  as  open  ports, 
vulnerabilities, etc. In this approach we used OpenVas 
as  a  Vulnerability  Assessment  Tool.  The  Open 
Vulnerability  Assessment  System  (OpenVAS)  is  a 
framework  of  several  services  and  tools  offering  a 
comprehensive and powerful vulnerability scanning and 
vulnerability management solution. After each network 
vulnerability  a  scanning  report  is  generated  with 
important  information;  host  IP,  port,  some  standard 
references such as CVE (Common Vulnerabilities and 
Exposures) and BID (BugTraq ID), description of this 
vulnerability and some information about it. Snort rules 
filtering  process  is  described  by  Fig.  1.Error! 
Reference  source  not  found.  It  is  based  on  two 
principal  parameters  (1)  Port  Number  an  (2) 
Vulnerability Description Tag (CVE, BID). For more 
details about of the filtering process you can refer to 
((http://www.amansystem.com.).  After  this  process,  a 
new rule-set is generated and used as input for snort. 
 
Real-time oriented scenario: We plan to apply the OS 
Tuning  to  the  Linux  2.6.33.7  Kernel.  A  previous 
version of the RT kernel patch rt29 was used and results 
were  not  accurate  (Hard  Disk  Latency  has  a  big 
influence  on  snort  processing  time,  which  increases 
quickly with RT patch activated). We are planning to 
use  the  latest  version  of  the  RT  patch 
(http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/projects/rt/patc
h-2.6.33.7.2-rt30.gz) released on 12/21/2010. This task 
is not yet finalized. 
Flow-oriented scenario: In this scenario, we realize a 
benchmarking  of  snort  with  a  filtered  input  stream 
without modifying its configuration nor the operating 
system.  In  this  scenario,  significant  parameters  are: 
CPU  usage,  CPU  Time,  Memory  Usage  (Virtual 
memory,  Resident  memory,  Shared  Memory).  Other 
parameters may be added. Some measures were taken 
but this scenario is not yet finalized. 
 
An  integrated  platform  for  DIDS  monitoring  in  a 
single domain: There are different free and commercial 
tools  used  by  many  network  administrators  but  not 
suitable in our context since they are not open source. To 
integrate our architectural improvement our platform is 
built  on  an  integration  of  interesting  free  open  source 
tools  such  as  Snort,  Nagios,  Base,  SnortCenter,  Acid, 
Ignoramuse,  and  their  plugins.  The  platform  detects 
attacks  by  managing  Snort  sensors  which  analyze  the 
network traffics continuously and convert it into specific 
events depending on certain rules and policies. Based on 
sensors  collected  data,  the  SDM  console  produces 
different  types  of  reports  to  help  the  system 
administrators to specify a certain rules and policies. The 
administrator can  view, add, update and  maintain new 
policies as well as edit the IDS rules. He can prioritize 
and analyze these events to find the real threats that need 
taking actions and ignore false positive alerts. 
 
RESULTS 
 
Management  architecture  implementation:  The 
previously presented architecture can be implemented 
in  several  ways.  We  should  choose  the  appropriate 
technology for each layer. Mainly we have to distribute 
the  data  and  the  processing  between  the  different 
architectural  level  components.  The  network 
administrators  either  those  responsible  for  multi 
domains  management  or  those  responsible  for  single 
domain management should have a tools to exchange 
the needed data to or from the other components in the 
same or different layer. As mentioned before, the MDM 
is responsible for the specification and the distribution 
of the proactive or reactive security polices, define and 
apply  the  different  event  correlation  algorithms  and 
load balancing techniques. 
  For  the  internal  or  external  attacks,  the  SDM 
aggregates and analyses the different alarm to detect 
an  eventual  local  internal  or  external  multi  host 
attacks.  It  will  execute  some  event  correlation 
algorithms for that purposes and defending operations. 
Theses    algorithms   and   operations   are  dictated 
by the  MDM  which   define   the    security   policies. J. Computer Sci., 7 (7): 1094-1104, 2011 
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Fig. 2: Policy based management architecture 
 
Thus,  depending  on  the  attack  nature,  the  SDM 
executes  an  automatic  security  policy  strategy  issued 
from the MDM and sends also a notification to the local 
network security administrator user to do the right and 
corrective actions. This model is more scalable than a 
full  source  driven  polling  approach.  Moreover  it 
enables MDM to build service level statistics which are 
specific to the security forensics service (e.g., checking 
and  collecting  the  attacks  evidences)  and  produces 
some  different  security  reports  about  the  network 
security status. 
  Policy-based  Network  Management  seems  to  be 
the  appropriate  technology  to  use  since  it  enables 
manager to specify rules governing choices in behavior 
of  the  system  without  having  to  know  how  to 
accomplish it for the specific devices. Consequently we 
can  change  system  behavior  without  modifying 
implementation  and  the  reuse  of  the  managers  in 
different environments Fig. 2. These characteristics will 
guarantee  the  flexibility  and  the  adaptability  required 
by our  management architecture. Figure 3 shows our 
policy based management architecture implementation. 
  In  PBNM  framework  there  are  three  main 
components  which  are:  Policy  Decision  Point  (PDP), 
Policy Consumer (PC) and Policy Target (PT). In our 
architecture the policy decision point will be the Multi-
Domain Manager (MDM). It will make policy decisions 
based on policy conditions. The policy consumer will 
be the SDM. It will receive policy and translates it into 
format applicable to target since it knows about target 
capabilities.  The  policy  target  will  be  IDS  Sensors 
which will execute the policy itself. The SDM can play 
the role of policy target for the MDM when it is needed 
for  example  if  we  need  to  balance  load  or  correlate 
events  between  the  different  SDM  in  the  intranet. 
Mainly, the management takes the following scenario. 
The administrator makes a new security policy rule or 
retrieves  existing  policy  from  directory  service  using 
LDAP  and  views  or  edits  policy.  He  associates  the 
policy with policy targets for example the SDM or IDS 
sensors.  The  policy  and  association  with  targets  is 
stored  in  the  repository  via  LDAP.  The  associated 
consumer for each target is notified that a new policy is 
available.  The  consumer  obtains  the  policy  from  the 
repository  via  LDAP  e.g.,  using  query  to  find  the 
policy.  The  consumer  processes  the  policy  and 
configures the targets using target-specific mechanism. 
Finally, for each target which received policy data, the 
consumer provides status information back to the policy 
management  application.  In  order  to  exchange  the 
polices  between  SDM  and  MDM  we  use  COPS 
protocol.  It  is  a  lightweight  and  efficient  protocol 
minimizing  the  signaling  traffic  involved  by  the 
management  process.  We  can  also  pre-configure 
devices with policy data, so they do not have to query 
the MDM on every event-provisioning. SNMP can be 
used between the policy target and the policy consumer 
since  the  SNMP  is  commonly  used  in  the  network 
devices.  We  can  also  use  other  appropriate  specific 
tools  to  manage  the  policy  target  depending  the 
platform  and  sensors  used  in  the  single  domain 
intrusion detection system.  
 
Efficiency improvement of snort IDS: 
Service-oriented  scenario:  Hardware  used  in  this 
scenario  is  a  computer  with  the  following 
characteristics: 
 
Parameter  Value 
OS  kernel  Ubuntu 10.10 (maverik) / Linux 2.6.35- 
  22-generic-pae 
CPU/ Memory  4 x Intel(R) Core(TM) i5 CPU   760  @  
  2.80GHz / 3.9GiB  
Hard Disk  500GB ATA WDC WD5000AAKS- 
  00UU3A0 
 
  We  run  this  test  with  the  four  different  streams 
dumped  from the “Capture the Flag” competition held 
at Defcon conference each year organized and run by 
the  Ghetto  Hackers.  The  traffic  generated  during 
DefCon days was dumped using the tcpdump program.  
For example, the dumped file RootFu!-11 which is a part 
of  the  Defcon-11  conference  encompasses  10527588 
packets in a 3.8 GB file. It contains about 31500 Snort 
alerts,  from  which  more  than  80%  is  HTTP.  We 
evaluated the following parameters for each test:  
 
·  Processing Time in seconds 
·  Mean value of Processed Packet/s 
·  TCP Rebuilt packets 
·  Number of detected POST requests 
·  Number of detected GET requests J. Computer Sci., 7 (7): 1094-1104, 2011 
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Fig. 3: Gain in processing time for different streams 
 
 
 
Fig. 4: Gain  in  processing  time  in  function  of  %  of 
HTTP packets in a stream 
 
 
 
Fig. 5: Relation between Gain in processing time and 
the  difference  between  TCP  rebuilt  packets 
numbers before and after modification 
 
Table 1: HTTP stream 
Service Oriented  HTTP Traffic 
Stream  RootFu  ctf-17  ctf-17-http.pcap  ctf-08/eth1 
  Defcon11       
Size(KB)  3871988  7598672  60016  2424536 
NB Packets  10527588  38994342  459835  12155014 
%HTTP Traffic  80.08%  0.79%  100.00%  48.65% 
 
  The results for each stream  are shown by 0 3-5. 
  Figure 3 shows the gain in processing time for the four 
different streams. Figure 4 shows the gain in processing 
time  in function of  % of HTTP packets in a  stream. 
Figure  5  shows  the  relation  between  the  gain  in 
processing time and the difference between TCP rebuilt 
packets  numbers  before  and  after  snort  code 
modification Table 1. We can observe the following: 
 
·   In  two  of  precedent  four  streams  we  have  a 
difference in number of processed POST requests 
and  GET requests  which  indicate  that  eliminated 
preprocessors influences snort behavior in term of 
TCP  packet  rebuilding  and  HTTP  stream 
reassembling 
·  When the number of TCP rebuilt packets increases, 
the  processing  time  increases  and  the  P.T  Gain 
decreases 
·  With all streams, except stream 1, we have a gain 
in processing time 
·  If we use all four streams results, we can calculate 
a  global  gain  in  processing  time  weighted  by 
stream size: 
 
1 1 2 2
3 3 4 4
1 2 3 4
size G size G
size G size G
G 5.62%
size size size size
´ + ´ +
´ + ´
= =
+ + +
  (1) 
 
Platform-oriented  scenario:  The  following  figures 
(Fig.  6-8)  show  the  difference  between  Snort 
performance  before  and  after  rules  filtering.  We 
evaluated the following parameters for each test:  
 
·  Some  global  statistics  before  and  after  rules 
filtering 
·  Scanning time before and after rules filtering 
·  Gain in percentage for some different parameters 
after rules filtering process 
 
  The results are shown by Fig. 6-8. Figure 6 shows 
the  difference  in  snort  alerts  when  original  rules  and 
filtered rules are used. Values used in this comparison 
are as following: 
 
·  Total number of alerts 
·  Alerts with port number 
·  Alerts with CVE reference 
·  Alerts  with  CVE  reference  not  detected  in 
OpenVas report 
·  Alerts with port number not detected in OpenVas 
report 
 
  Figure  7  shows  the  gain  in  scanning  time.  We 
observe a good benefit in term of scanning time. This 
will increase the effectiveness of the intrusion detection 
and allows for greater capability to take action in real-
time against intruders. J. Computer Sci., 7 (7): 1094-1104, 2011 
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Fig. 6: Global Statistics before and after rules filtering 
 
 
 
Fig. 7: Snort scanning time before and after rules filtering 
 
 
 
Fig. 8: Gain in percentage for different parameters after 
rules filtering process 
 
 
 
Fig. 9: The integrated platform main menus 
 
  Figure 8 shows gain in percentage in term of: 
 
·  Hard Disk Space 
·  Snort Processing Time 
·  Number of alerts with ports not in OpenVas report 
(false ports) 
·  Number  of  alerts  with  CVE  reference  not  in 
OpenVas Report (false CVE) 
 
An  integrated  platform  for  DIDS  monitoring  in  a 
single  domain:  The  front  end  of  the  system  is  an 
integration  of  different  tools  in  a  well-designed  web 
page  to  make  managing  and  controlling  the  system 
easier. The main functionalities of the platform GUI are 
(1) the controlling of the snort sensors and the editing 
of  their  rules  and  configuration  files  by  using 
SnortCenter, (2) showing the traffic analyzing graphs 
and producing the generated events in tables by using 
BASE  (3)  the  network  monitoring  and  checking  of 
network  hosts  and  services  by  using  Nagios  and  its 
plugins  (NDOUTIL,  NRPE,  IGNORAMUS).  The 
management of the Nagios configuration files is done 
via  our  enhanced  Ignoramus  plugin  to  delete  and 
Update the Nagios configurations files. Figure 9 present 
respectively  the  operations  provided  by  SnortCenter, 
Base and Nagios. It is noted that all communication and 
data transfer between the sensors and the administrator 
are secure by using SSL and SSH protocols. 
  Figure  10  represents  some  policy  based 
management  operations  provided  to  administrator  to 
manage  the  distributed  intrusion  detection  process. 
Basically  the  administrator  is  able  specify  policies 
generating alerts when communication is lost between 
components of network or when the traffic load on a 
host  exceed  its  capacity  and  in  this  case  a  rule  is 
activated  to  analyze  traffic  (Fig.  10a).  He  can  also 
classify  alerts  as  high,  medium  or  low  in  real  time, 
block  traffic  from  certain  IP  address  or  ports  and 
display  the  alert  status  report  (Fig.  10b  and  c). 
Moreover,  He  can  create  reports  based  on  traffic 
analysis  and  network  monitoring  including 
communication  protocol,  domain,  IP  address,  port  of 
source,  domain,  IP  address,  port  of  destination,  rule 
violated, type of attack if possible and recommended 
fixes if any (Fig. 10d). 
  Another interesting feature for this platform is to 
provide  the  administrator  with  real  snapshot  of  the 
attacks behavior Based on two criteria  which are the 
IDS  characteristics  and  the  nature  of  the  incoming 
traffic, the administrator will be more comprehensive of 
security  risks  and  attacks  his  network  is  exposed  to. 
Firstly the Snort rules  files  are studied to extract the 
most  vulnerable  ports  (Fig.  5  First  histogram).  This 
gives the administrator valuable information on which 
services should be more careful. Secondly we studied 
the RootFu! dumped traffic which is the descendant of 
the  Capture  the  Flag  competition  held  at  Defcon 
conference each year organized and run by the Ghetto 
Hackers. J. Computer Sci., 7 (7): 1094-1104, 2011 
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(a) 
 
 
(b) 
 
 
(c) 
 
 
(d) 
 
Fig. 10: Some IDS Policy based operations 
 
  The  traffic  generated  during  RootFu!  days  was 
dumped using the tcpdump program. For example the 
dumped file RootFu!-11 which is a part of the Defcon-
11 conference encompasses 10527588 packets in a 3.7 
GB file. It contains about 31500 Snort's alert. The main 
objective  of  this  statistical  study  is  to  give  the 
administrator the most used ports by the hackers (see 
Fig  11.  RootFu!-11  of  DefCon-11).  Based  on  this 
information the administrator can adapt the IDS rules 
since he will be more aware of the hacker's behavior. 
These  statistics  are  performed  by  a  statistical 
component integrated in the platform which performs 
several statistics to help the admin to adapt the security 
policies according to the traffic behavior. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 11:  Most vulnerable ports In Snort Rules and Most 
used port in DefCon11 
 
  In  addition  to  these  functionalities  the  platform 
specifies in detail the running services on each node in 
the  network  (sensors,  servers,  hosts),  provides  auto 
configuration for the network nodes and their service 
checking, displays them in a map and draws graphs and 
charts  for  the  analyzed  traffic  and  notifies  the 
administrators of any odd activities via emails and SMS 
messages if he was far away. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
  Since  traditional  centralized  approaches  to  traffic 
analysis  cannot  scale  with  the  increase  of  bandwidth 
advances  mainly  due  to  their  memory  and 
computational  requirements,  a  number  of  Distributed 
Intrusion Detection Systems (DIDS) architectures have 
been proposed for dedicated network monitoring tasks. 
However,  they  remain  not  scalable  in  the  context  of J. Computer Sci., 7 (7): 1094-1104, 2011 
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high  speed  networks.  These  tasks  become  more 
complex if we require a real-time security defending. 
Improving efficiency, real-time and scalability of IDS 
in  HSN  passes  through  specifying  a  dedicated 
integrated  security  management  framework.  Such 
framework  makes  it  easier  to  work  with  complex 
technologies and it ties together a bunch of components 
into  more  useful  integrated  architectural  solution  as 
well as it ensures its good and flexible implementation 
easily tested and debugged. 
  We  presented  here  an  efficient  dedicated  IDS 
management  framework  improving  efficiency,  real-
time and scalability of IDS management in High Speed 
Networks. A hierarchical distributed architecture and its 
policy  based  management  implementation  are 
described,  some  IDS  real-time  and  efficiency 
improvement  are  evaluated  and  an  integrated  IDS 
monitoring platform is proposed. This platform can be 
used in forensic analysis purposes by tracking down the 
attack activities and intruder violations. As future work, 
we envisage implementing the overall architecture and 
extending it to  multi domain environment. We intent 
also  to  illustrate  its  applicability  and  show  how  the 
framework can cope with different IDS security alerts 
correlation techniques and load balancing algorithms. 
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